In Practice · Scenario set · 02 Prove it Safe
When cross-cutting standards change the picture: three CRA scenarios
A product-specific standard can bring an industrial device into focus. A cross-cutting standard can reveal the security issues, processes and evidence that remain relevant across product categories. Three illustrative scenarios show how the two perspectives can work together in the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) standards landscape.
In Practice
The scenarios as slides
The slides of the LinkedIn carousel, played here as a silent film. There is no file to download; the full text of every slide is on this page.
One product, more than one standards perspective
The scenarios in the CRA standards structure
- A — Framework: the risk-based context of the CRA work program.
- B — Horizontal: security aspects and processes shared across products, such as generic security requirements and vulnerability handling.
- C — Product-specific: profiles for individual product types.
- 1 — A sensor without a matching profile. 2 — A firewall profile with an assessment boundary. 3 — One library in two product families.
An industrial product can have a clear product identity and still contain functions that cut across product categories. An industrial sensor may provide a networked administration interface. A firewall may include a remote-service function. A gateway and a sensor may both rely on the same software library. In each case, cybersecurity decisions extend beyond the product name.
The European Commission’s CRA standardization request describes horizontal standards as a common framework that supports manufacturers and the development of more specific vertical standards. In the CRA work program, Type A is used for a framework, Type B for horizontal work addressing shared aspects, and Type C for product-specific standards. The terminology should be read in the context of this work program; it does not make every A/B/C classification in other standardization fields interchangeable. The Commission also allows for broad vertical standards covering a wider sector, such as operational technology (OT), which may support the development of more specific standards.
The horizontal Type B perspective becomes consequential when it draws attention to an issue that cannot be settled solely by identifying a product category. Its value lies in making a shared security aspect or process visible and connecting it to the specific product, its risks and the evidence available.
The examples refer to the generic security requirements work item prEN 40000-1-4 and the vulnerability-handling work item prEN 40000-1-3. These references identify work under development; the examples do not assert that a particular draft contains the detailed controls or procedures described below.
Scenario 1 — A sensor has no matching product profile
A manufacturer develops a network-connected industrial sensor. An administration interface allows authorized personnel to configure the device and install updates. For the purpose of this example, no product-specific CRA profile matches this sensor.
If the team searches only for a Type C standard, the standards search stops before the security assessment has begun. The absence of a matching product profile does not, however, remove applicable CRA obligations. The intended use, network exposure, administration functions and foreseeable misuse still need to be assessed.
The horizontal generic security work represented by prEN 40000-1-4 provides a different perspective: the team can examine a security aspect shared by many products — protection against unauthorized access — rather than depend on the existence of a sensor-specific standard. Depending on the actual scope and status of the relevant documents, the manufacturer may also consider suitable OT-related standards such as IEC 62443-4-2. The applicable legal requirements remain the starting point.
What changes
The team moves from a product-category search to an assessment of the interface itself. It identifies who can access the administration function, how that access is controlled, and how the selected controls will be verified. For example, it may decide to restrict access to authorized accounts and test the configured access paths. Those measures are illustrative choices, not statements about the contents of a draft standard.
Documentation and evidence
The product scope, interface description, risk assessment, access-control decisions, configuration and test results are linked. If no matching product-specific profile is identified, the standards assessment records that finding rather than treating it as a reason to omit the security issue.
Scenario 2 — A firewall profile meets an assessment boundary
A manufacturer develops an industrial firewall with an additional remote-service interface. Assume that a product-specific profile is relevant to the firewall, but that the team’s initial assessment has not yet examined the service interface.
A profile can focus the assessment on product-specific risks and technical characteristics. Its existence does not, by itself, establish that every relevant function has been included in a particular assessment. The team therefore checks the actual profile scope, its normative references and the documented assessment boundary. It also examines whether the service interface falls within that boundary and which requirements apply to it.
A cross-cutting generic-security perspective can help the team identify issues to consider at that interface, such as access control and protection of software updates. The horizontal work does not automatically add a separate set of mandatory requirements to the profile. A relevant aspect may already be addressed by the product-specific standard or a referenced document. If an assessment gap is confirmed, the team selects suitable additional specifications or other evidence to address it.
What changes
The assessment is no longer described simply as “the firewall profile was applied.” Its boundary becomes explicit. The team can distinguish what the profile assessment covered from what still requires review and can adjust its evidence plan accordingly.
Documentation and evidence
The record identifies the product and interface versions, the standard and edition assessed, the requirements and references used, the interface assessment, any confirmed gap, the chosen response and verification results.
Limit of the example. This is an assumed assessment gap for learning purposes. It is not a claim that the draft industrial-firewall profile (prEN 50770-1) excludes remote-service interfaces or that a specific product standard contains a defect.
Scenario 3 — One vulnerability affects two product families
A manufacturer uses the same third-party software library in an industrial gateway and a network-connected sensor. A vulnerability is reported in a version of that library after both products have entered the market.
The products may have different functions, interfaces and applicable product-specific standards. The vulnerability-handling activity nevertheless crosses those product boundaries. The manufacturer needs to determine where the affected component is present, whether each product is exposed in its configuration, and what response is appropriate.
The horizontal vulnerability-handling work item prEN 40000-1-3 is intended to address this cross-product process. The CRA itself contains vulnerability-handling requirements in Annex I, Part II. The example below illustrates a practical process; it does not attribute individual process steps to a particular clause of the draft.
Suppose the component record identifies the vulnerable library in both products. The gateway uses the affected function, while the sensor’s configuration does not expose it. The team may need a corrective update for the gateway and a documented impact assessment for the sensor. Both decisions require a traceable basis; a shared component name alone does not establish identical impact.
What changes
The manufacturer treats the vulnerability as one cross-product issue with product-specific assessments and responses. A common process connects component identification, impact assessment, remediation and communication without flattening the differences between the gateway and the sensor.
Documentation and evidence
The record connects the component and affected versions to each product version, the assessment and its assumptions, corrective actions or the rationale for no action, test results and relevant customer communication. Whether a reporting obligation applies must be assessed under the specific conditions of the CRA; not every identified vulnerability is automatically reportable.
Coherence makes the connections usable
The three scenarios show three distinct contributions of a cross-cutting standard: it can support assessment where no matching product profile exists, provide a shared perspective when a product-specific assessment has a boundary, and organize an activity that extends across product families.
The relationships are not automatic. A product-specific standard may incorporate or refer to relevant horizontal provisions, or address an issue in a different product-specific way. The actual documents determine those relationships. A manufacturer should not assume that every B standard must always be added on top of every C standard, or that a C standard is necessarily incomplete without a separate B standard.
The CRA standardization request asks for coordination between horizontal and vertical work. It also requires justified deviations from horizontal standards in the context of the requested standards work. This is an instruction for developing the standards, not a general rule that can be transferred unchanged to every manufacturer’s documentation decision.
Legal effect remains a separate assessment
A standard’s technical relevance and its legal effect are different matters. A draft may help a team understand the direction of standards work, but it does not itself create a presumption of conformity. For an applicable harmonized standard, the manufacturer must check the reference published in the Official Journal, the edition and any restrictions, and the requirements covered. Correct application supports a presumption only for the covered requirements; conformity assessment remains necessary.
A horizontal standard can therefore be important to the design and evidence strategy even when its publication or citation status does not provide the legal effect a reader might expect. Conversely, the presence of a product-specific standard should not substitute for a clear assessment of its scope and the product functions actually evaluated.
Documentation work that can follow
In all three scenarios, the decisive information already exists in different places: in the product scope, the interface descriptions, the risk assessment, the component records, the test results and the customer communication. The documentation work connects it so that each decision can be traced to its basis and each change can be followed through the versions.
- A standards assessment that records which standards, editions and references were assessed, including the finding that no matching product profile was identified.
- Interface descriptions and an explicit assessment boundary per product version.
- Links from the risk assessment to the chosen controls and to their verification.
- Component records linked to product versions, with impact assessments and the rationale where no action is taken.
- User information and customer communication that follow the decisions, also after a vulnerability has been handled.
The documentation work organizes and connects this information. Security decisions, testing and conformity assessment stay with the manufacturer and, where involved, the notified bodies.
Standards status
Status of the documents named on this page, as stated in the sources. Standards status checked on .
| Document | Type | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act) | Regulation | In force; see Annex I Part II (vulnerability handling) and Article 27 (presumption of conformity) |
| C(2025) 618 — standardization request M/606 | Commission Implementing Decision | Adopted on 3 February 2025; describes horizontal, vertical and broad vertical standards |
| prEN 40000-1-4 | Type B, generic security requirements | Work item under development (draft) |
| prEN 40000-1-3 | Type B, vulnerability handling | Work item under development (draft) |
| IEC 62443-4-2:2019 | International standard, technical security requirements for IACS components | Published; does not by itself establish CRA harmonization or an Official Journal reference |
Sources and further reading
- Commission Implementing Decision C(2025) 618, Annexes I and II — CRA standardization request M/606. European Commission, 3 February 2025. Horizontal and vertical standards, broad vertical standards, coherence and the scope information expected in the standards (Annex II, especially 2.1 and 2.3).
- Cyber Resilience Act — Standardisation. European Commission, checked on 18 November 2026. Overview of the standards program and its subsequent amendment; check the page for the current status.
- Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 — Cyber Resilience Act. European Union, 20 November 2024. Annex I, especially Part II, for vulnerability-handling requirements and Article 27 for presumption of conformity.
- Standardisation Request Cyber Resilience Act. CEN-CENELEC, 2 October 2026. The horizontal work items, their relationship to vertical standards and the development situation at that date.
- CRA Notified Body Accreditation — Gap Analysis. ENISA, November 2026. Identifies prEN 40000-1-3 as CRA vulnerability-handling work under development and distinguishes draft status from Official Journal citation.
- IEC 62443-4-2:2019 — Technical security requirements for IACS components. International Electrotechnical Commission, 27 February 2019. Scope of the international standard; the publication does not itself establish CRA harmonization or an Official Journal reference.