Real Cases · Scenario report · 03 Keep it Safe
Seven meters short. The limit switch did not stop the hook.
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Summary
A hoisting wire renewed shortly before an engine overhaul was 7 m shorter than the crane manufacturer specified. The hoist limit switch did not cut power, and the wire broke while a 1200 kg cylinder liner was being lifted. A scenario report on one value that the manual and the maintenance system stated differently.
Eight panels and a closing picture. The drawings stop before the wire breaks; roles only, as the report names them.
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The sequence in pictures 01 / 08
Overhaul of a diesel generator in the engine room. -
The hoisting wire was renewed shortly before the work. -
The manual and the maintenance system state different wire lengths.The drawing shows only that the two differ; it shows no values. -
The new wire is 7 m shorter than the crane manufacturer specifies. -
The cylinder liner has to be lifted to the maximum lift height. -
The shorter wire affects the operation of the limit switch. -
The limit switch does not cut power to the winch motor. -
The correct value was in the manual. The maintenance system held a different one.Source: MAIB Safety Digest 1/2023, case 6. -
The crane involved was not an isolated case: the limit switches of the three other engine room cranes also failed to cut power in the tests. -
What happened, as reported
On a cruise ship, the engineering team were overhauling a large diesel generator together with technicians of the engine manufacturer. The heavy engine components were lifted with the overhead gantry crane of the engine room.
One of the cylinder liners, 1200 kg each, was being lifted into position above the engine. For this, the electric winch motor had to raise the crane hook to its maximum lift height. During the lift, the hoisting wire suddenly broke. The liner fell onto the engine and damaged both. It struck the left foot of an engine room fitter who was standing nearby. The crew member was treated in hospital for a broken toe and then repatriated.
The wire had been renewed shortly before the maintenance work started. It was 7 m shorter than the length the crane manufacturer specifies in its technical manual. The shorter wire affected the operation of the hoist limit switch: when the hook reached the maximum lift height, the switch did not cut power to the winch motor. The motor was able to overload the wire until it failed.
Tests of the three other engine room cranes showed that none of their limit switches cut power to the winch motors; they did not meet the manufacturer’s requirements. The wire length recorded in the ship’s planned maintenance system (PMS) was found to be incorrect when compared with the manufacturer’s specification.
The cranes were taken out of service for repair. The engineering team were instructed to carry out a full inspection of the engine room hoisting devices and to make sure that all equipment met the manufacturer’s specifications. They were also reminded to test the hoist limit switches before operating the cranes.
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The one value
The case turns on one value, the length of the hoisting wire. It appears in three places: in the crane manufacturer’s technical manual, in the record of the planned maintenance system and, physically, in the wire on the drum. According to the report, the PMS record was incorrect when compared with the manufacturer’s specification, and the installed wire was 7 m shorter than that specification.
The report does not state:
- the specified and the actual length of the wire,
- why the PMS value was incorrect (the MAIB states that this is unclear),
- whether the replacement wire was ordered or selected by the PMS value,
- how the limit switch is built and where it sits,
- why the limit switches of the three other cranes failed,
- who gave the instruction after the accident.
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Keep it · Prove it · Write it
Own reading. The following analysis is the reading of writeitsafe.com and is not part of the report.
- Keep it Safe
- A load-bearing component was renewed. The value in the maintenance system did not match the manufacturer’s documentation. No check that would have detected this difference can be seen in the reported sequence. Why the PMS value was incorrect is unclear, according to the MAIB.
- Prove it Safe
- After the wire was renewed, evidence would have been needed that the protective function still worked. The report does not mention such evidence. The tests of the three other cranes show that the failure of the limit switches was not limited to the crane involved.
- Write it Safe
- Two levels stay apart. The reported measure: test the hoist limit switches before operating the cranes — a reminder, not a new requirement. The lesson of the MAIB: stop the lift before overhead capacity is reached; the limit switch is a protective device, not an operating control. The work step required the hook to be raised to its maximum lift height, the very position at which the lesson says not to rely on the limit switch.
The manual and the maintenance system stated different wire lengths. The wire installed was 7 m too short. The information was not missing; what was missing was a controlled match between the manufacturer’s documentation and the maintenance record.
The report does not say that the wire was ordered or selected by the PMS value.
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The lesson on the limit switch
The MAIB draws three lessons from the case, retold here:
- Do not stand under or near suspended loads, even when the lifting equipment is new or has just been overhauled. Equipment can fail at any time.
- Relying on hoist limit switches to cut power to the winch motor is risky, on cranes as on lifeboat davits. A high-torque electric winch motor can over-stress the wire until it fails. Stopping the lift before overhead capacity is reached is safer, even when the system is set up correctly and the limit switch has been tested.
- Lifting operations are hazardous and need a careful risk assessment. Chapter 19 of the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers (COSWP) gives guidance on the control measures before and during such tasks.
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What technical communication can do, and what it cannot
Own reading. The following analysis is the reading of writeitsafe.com and is not part of the report.
Technical communication can:
- carry safety-relevant values from the manufacturer’s documentation into maintenance data in a controlled way and record where they come from,
- write a check step into the instruction for the replacement of safety-relevant parts, following the manufacturer’s requirements,
- bring the lesson on the limit switch into the operating instruction, the briefing and the pre-use checklist.
It does not replace a technical protective measure, nor the competent inspection and release of a hoist. Responsibility depends on role, remit and the applicable safety management system; the report assigns none. The crane manufacturer’s manual stated the correct length.
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Transfer
Own reading. The following analysis is the reading of writeitsafe.com and is not part of the report.
The principle reaches beyond ships. On machinery ashore and on medical devices, spare parts, configuration data and maintenance records also carry values from the manufacturer’s documentation. Wherever such a value is copied into another system, the same need for a controlled match arises. The case itself does not fall under machinery law; only the principle is transferred.
The MAIB itself names lifeboat davits. The case note “The lifeboat interlock” on sainaveigel.com follows an interlock on a lifeboat davit that was installed but no longer able to protect (principle only).
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Source and related
Source: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), Safety Digest 1/2023, case 6, “Cylinder liners and metatarsals: a painful combination”, pages 12 – 13. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Retold and analyzed independently.
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